

BANKS, NATHANIEL P

DRAWER 9B

GENERALS (UNION)

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Civil War Officers Union

Nathaniel Prentiss Banks

Excerpts from newspapers and other
sources

From the files of the
Lincoln Financial Foundation Collection

GEN. BANKS PRAISED BY THE PRESIDENT.

New York, 13th. The Tribune's Washington despatch reports the President as saying last evening: "I regard Gen. Banks as one of the best men in the army. He makes me no trouble, but with a large or a small force he always knows his duty and does it."

Boston Transcript Aug. 13, 1862 ✓

Excerpt from Address of Melvin M. Johnson, Esq., delivered
at Middlesex Club Meeting Feb. 12, '34

To relate at this day an unpublished, yet important, episode in the official life of President Lincoln may strike you as impossible, but I think I can do it.

It was my honor and good fortune from boyhood until I was twenty-three years of age, to enjoy personal contact and friendship with General Nathaniel P. Banks, of Waltham. You will remember him as Speaker of the Massachusetts Legislature, Speaker of the National House of Representatives, Governor of Massachusetts, and Major-General during the Civil War. For many years, my father was his close friend and for almost a decade (from 1879 until 1898) his most intimate associate outside of his family circle.

The General related to my father this episode which so impressed me as a youth that I have never forgotten it or the circumstances under which it was related.

In the early part of 1864, President Lincoln was selecting someone to whom should be entrusted the command of the entire Union Army. His choice fell upon General Banks, then a Major-General of Volunteers, and at the height of his military career. This was before the disastrous Red River Expedition into which General Banks was forced against his will and judgment.

I have the authority of General Banks' own words that Lincoln offered to him the command of the entire army. Banks declined, telling the President that he was not equal to the task but that someone should be chosen with a West Point education, and whose career had been that of a soldier. The career of Banks had been largely that of a civilian. Banks suggested Major-General of Regulars, Ulysses S. Grant. In substance, President Lincoln replied that if he had enough confidence in General Banks to offer him command of the entire army he ought to have sufficient confidence to respect Banks' decision and judgment upon that question. This led to the tender of the command to General Grant in March, 1864, and the latter's appointment as Lieutenant General.

General Banks stated that among his files, which as I recall it were stored in boxes or barrels at his home, would be found documents verifying this story. Unfortunately, General Banks' literary executor, Mr. Malloy, died without publishing either his biography or any of his papers. Whether or not they have been preserved, I do not know. I give you the story as I heard it when a boy.



Lincoln Lore

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Mary Jane Hubler, Editorial Assistant. Published each month by the
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Number 1693

PEYTON McCrARY ON LINCOLN'S LOUISIANA EXPERIMENT: A REVIEW

The capture of New Orleans by Commodore David Glasgow Farragut on April 25, 1862 gave the North a pleasing taste of victory and gave the Lincoln administration an opportunity to test the depths of Confederate sentiment in a state of the lower South. To judge from the fact that Federal troops occupied the state for fifteen years thereafter, one would have to say that the sentiment ran very deep indeed. Professor Peyton McCrary's book, *Abraham Lincoln and Reconstruction: The Louisiana Experiment* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978) agrees that the sentiment was strong but argues that the opportunity to use white Southern dissidents and Negroes as a base upon which to build a viable party to revolutionize that sentiment was missed. He lays most of the blame for missing the opportunity on General Nathaniel P. Banks and not on the man who chose him to reconstruct Louisiana, Abraham Lincoln.

Chapter VI is the crucial one for Lincoln students. Reconstructing Louisiana would be no more difficult than "the passage of a dog law in Massachusetts," General Nathaniel P. Banks, military commander of the Department of the Gulf, informed President Lincoln in one of the extreme political understatements of American history. Anxious for speedy action towards reconstruction in occupied Louisiana, disgusted with the slow progress to date, and impressed with Bank's extravagant promises of quick results, Lincoln wrote the general on Christmas Eve, 1863, to make him "master of all" in giving "us a free-state reorganization of Louisiana in the shortest possible time." No longer would jurisdictional disputes between the military governor, George F. Shepley, and the commander of the military district, Banks,

slow the reconstruction process. Lincoln could not have been much impressed, either, with the work of the local radical white movement for reconstruction led by the Free State General Committee. They had been fumbling along with Shepley to organize elections for a constitutional convention in Louisiana, and Banks would presumably be their master

too. However, Lincoln did state carefully that Banks was not "to throw away available work already done for reconstruction," and the Free State Committee had been doing much of that work.

The immediate background of Lincoln's letter to Banks was the visit to Washington of two Louisiana conservatives, Thomas Cottman and James Riddell. These men led a movement opposed to Negro suffrage, and they argued that occupied Louisiana would likely be willing to return to the Union under the provisions of the President's recent Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction (December 8, 1863) and thus recognize emancipation — if "they could come back to civil government under their [existing] constitution and laws." In other words, they feared the movement of the Free State Committee, which was beginning to show itself willing to cooperate with elite Negro groups in Louisiana, to draw up a new state constitution before electing a new government for the state and presenting the state to Congress for readmission to the Union. The old state constitution, of course, restricted voting to whites only. They told Lincoln that Louisiana's citizens would not accept a government reconstructed with Negro votes. The day before Lincoln wrote his letter giving Banks exclusive control of the situation, Riddell wrote the general to tell him that the President would soon send a letter authorizing him to take control.



From the Louis A. Warren
Lincoln Library and Museum

FIGURE 1. General Nathaniel P. Banks.



From the Louis A. Warren
Lincoln Library and Museum

FIGURE 2. Lincoln is depicted as the impossible idealist Don Quixote in this political cartoon by the brilliant Copperhead etcher, Adalbert Johann Volck. Benjamin F. Butler makes an excellent Sancho Panza, ironically rooting Lincoln's idealism in the earthy character of this cockeyed general reputed to have stolen silverware from the mansions of occupied New Orleans (note the knife stuck in his belt). Butler, who incurred Volck's talented wrath when he commanded Federal forces in the cartoonist's beloved Maryland, went on to command Federal forces in occupied New Orleans and to become a favorite target of Volck's savage wit. The artist wrote and illustrated the *Life and Adventures of B. F. B. (Bombastes Furioso Buncombe), The Warrior, Sage and Philanthropist, A Christmas Story* in 1862 and reissued it with slight changes in 1868 as *The American Cyclops, The Hero of New Orleans and Spoiler of Silver Spoons*. Butler's sensational actions in New Orleans did much to focus national attention on events in Louisiana. This fine example of Volck's work is a recent acquisition of the Louis A. Warren Lincoln Library and Museum and joins a rare set of his pro-Confederate etchings.

General Banks then lied to Lincoln, or at least neglected to tell him the whole truth. On December 30, 1863, he told the President that his own scheme — which, by design or by coincidence, was like the scheme suggested by Riddell and Cottman — would work faster than that of the Free State Committee. Banks said that the election called for by that Committee could not be held until March; he did not tell him that they were calling for elections on January 25th. McCrary considers this deception important for explaining Lincoln's shift in reconstruction policy for Louisiana.

McCrary points out still another important change in the Louisiana situation. George Denison, a Treasury agent in New Orleans appointed by Salmon P. Chase, had given up his opposition to Banks's policies in the state by the time Lincoln turned the Louisiana operation over to Banks. The general could now count on the cooperation of this powerful Treasury Department presence in the state, but the price of Denison's support — as an intermediary between Denison and Banks, B. Rush Plumly, told Chase — had been a promise by Banks to deliver reconstructed Louisiana's delegates to the Republican Presidential nominating convention in 1864 to Chase rather than President Lincoln. Of all this, of course, Lincoln was profoundly ignorant, as all historians have been since. Denison personally carried Banks's deceptive letter to Lincoln in Washington.

McCrary's is certainly the best account of the origins of reconstruction policy in Louisiana in 1863-1864, but, even so,

its meaning is not as clear as McCrary seems to think it is. To him it seems that Banks had engineered a "coup," altering the radical direction of Louisiana politics under the Free State Committee's leadership and forcing Lincoln to move in a more moderate direction led by General Banks. McCrary attributes the general's motivation to political ambition. An outsider could more quickly organize a few candidates for a state government than he could a hundred delegates for a constitutional convention, and a speedy restoration of the state would be a political achievement helpful to his dark-horse chances for a Presidential nomination in 1864. Moreover, McCrary claims, "Banks' ideological differences with the radicals centered on the question of Negro suffrage, which he feared would antagonize many potential supporters of the free state movement." Lincoln's "motivation . . . in throwing power into the general's hands" is "not entirely clear" to McCrary, but he stresses that "Banks had deceived him about the situation: the President did not know that the radicals were ready to hold an election within a month." On the other hand, McCrary admits, "Lincoln may have shared the general's reluctance to countenance Negro suffrage in Louisiana for fear of antagonizing conservative opinion."

McCrary makes a great advance over the existing literature on the subject, but he somewhat overstates his case. He can prove "deception" — a powerful word in swaying the reader's sentiments — only in the case of the timing of Banks's election as opposed to that called for by the Free State Committee. Yet that deception occurred *after* Lincoln had given control to Banks on the 24th; Banks's letter about election dates was dated the 30th. Otherwise, Banks's campaign to secure control of Louisiana politics had been based on oversanguine predictions and a braggart's inflation of his own abilities, but the election dates provide the crucial case for deception — and they could have nothing to do with Lincoln's decision to make Banks "master of all."

The true origins of Lincoln's shift to Banks in Louisiana lay in the visit of Cottman and Riddell. The latter's letter of December 23, 1863 accurately predicted what Lincoln's letter of December 24, 1863 would do: give the authority to Banks. The Louisiana conservatives had also given the President an earful of arguments proving that Louisiana would never swallow a reconstruction brought about even in part by Negro votes. Nor does it seem fair to call Banks's view that Negro suffrage would block acceptance of any new Louisiana government an "ideological" difference from the Free State Committee. It was a tactical one, a practical one, a question of means rather than of ends. The use of the word "ideological," however, tends to conjure up in the reader's mind a frothing-mouthed ideology of racial hatred.

There can be no blinking this chronology away, and it is ironic that so gifted a narrative historian would do so. It is especially ironic because McCrary's conclusion stresses the importance of the "precise chronology of events" in December of 1863. To be sure, much of the chronology points to the accuracy of McCrary's conclusions, and it is only fair to quote the fuller chronology here:

A major turning point in wartime reconstruction occurred in December 1863, when General Banks decided to seize control of the reorganization of civil government in Louisiana. . . . The general asked Lincoln to grant him full authority over reconstruction on December 6, before learning of the President's ten-percent proclamation — but after Durant [leader of the Free State Committee] had openly advocated the limited enfranchisement of blacks. Lincoln's proclamation was delivered to Congress, moreover, before he received Banks' request; nothing in the document necessitated the substitution of Banks' new plan for a continuation of the existing program of reorganizing civil government through a constitutional convention. The sole issue involved was Lincoln's impatience with the slow pace of voter registration, which Banks attributed to the incompetence of Shepley and Attorney General Durant. In none of his correspondence with the President did Banks mention the controversial issue of Negro suffrage; nor did Lincoln comment on the question when authorizing the general to take charge of reconstruction, even though representatives of the sugar planters had just told him in his White House office that Durant was already registering the free men of color. The President's instructions to Banks on December 24 did not preclude the adoption of Negro suffrage; in fact, they suggested that the general continue to work with the leaders of the Union Association. It was Banks' idea to throw down

the gauntlet to the New Orleans radicals and offer the full weight of military influence and patronage to the moderate minority within the Union Association.

Making Banks the active source of change in policy from radical to moderate is a bit less convincing than McCrary's interesting proof that Lincoln did not shift to Banks in order to keep Louisiana from falling into the hands of radicals who would support Chase for the Presidency. Ironically, it was Chase's man Denison, who carried Banks's deceptive letter to Lincoln, and Denison's willingness to work with Banks to get Louisiana's delegates for Chase surely discredits the old view of Lincoln's shift in Louisiana as a shift away from Chase. In fact, one of McCrary's most valuable contributions is to show the unity of the Free State movement before Banks took over; Banks's policies created a factional split in 1864.

McCrary's emphasis on the passage in Lincoln's letter to Banks which cautioned him against throwing away existing work towards reconstruction seems very proper. When Denison brought Banks's letter to Lincoln, what a vision of unity in Louisiana Lincoln must have seen!

McCrary is at his best in showing that Andrew Johnson, when he assumed the Presidency after Lincoln's assassination, completely reversed the policies of his predecessor. Lincoln had created a moderate regime led by Banks's favorite, Governor Michael Hahn. When Hahn resigned to run for the United States Senate, Madison Wells assumed the office. He very quickly executed a conservative coup, replacing the mayor of New Orleans with a man who in turn replaced most of the local officials with conservatives and returning Confederate veterans. Wells himself appointed former Confederate Major Paul Théard as judge and filled other offices with conservatives, planters, and ex-Confederates. Even General Beauregard was expecting an appointment. Banks returned from Washington as military commander and quick-

ly confronted Wells. The Governor asked President Johnson to give him Banks's powers. Banks halted Wells's removals, replacing the new mayor of New Orleans with a former captain of a Negro regiment. Wells demanded that the President intervene, and on May 17, 1865, Johnson deprived Banks of command. Johnson sustained Wells's reorganization of the state completely. Lincoln may have failed to bring about a revolution in Louisiana politics and society, but Andrew Johnson certainly brought about a counterrevolution against the moderate Banks-Lincoln government. McCrary states it very well: "When Andrew Johnson assumed the presidency in 1865 he pursued a reconstruction policy antithetical to that of his predecessor, if viewed in terms of its impact on the party system rather than in light of superficial constitutional similarities." Of this there can be no doubt.

Lincoln students will also find in McCrary's book the best treatment in print of Lincoln's last speech. Delivered from the torchlit balcony of the White House on the night of April 11, 1865, Lincoln's speech, McCrary says, "made a less favorable impression when delivered than when read in the morning newspaper." The speech dealt "almost exclusively with events in Louisiana." Significantly, Lincoln had asked Senator Charles Sumner, radical critic of his Louisiana policies, to appear with him on the balcony while he gave the speech. Sumner declined, but McCrary notes acutely that Lincoln did not ask Banks to appear, though Banks was in town and had been lobbying for Lincoln's Louisiana government for months. Lincoln defended his commitment to the moderate government of Michael Hahn, "but as bad promises are better broken than kept," he said fairly, "I shall treat this as a bad promise, and break it, whenever I shall be convinced that keeping it is adverse to the public interest." He concluded with those mysterious words which have puzzled and titillated historians for over a hundreds years: "... it may be my duty to make some new announcement to the people of the South." McCrary's view is that Lincoln was most likely to announce that he would institute a more radical reconstruction policy.

There are many insights, too, that are tangential to the Lincoln theme. I know no better treatment, for example, of General Benjamin F. Butler's decision to use Negro troops in Louisiana. In the spring and summer of 1862, General Butler was embroiled in a feud with General John W. Phelps over contraband Negroes in occupied Louisiana. Picturing himself in his autobiography as a radical in advance of his times on this question, Butler has recently been attacked as a conservative opponent of Phelps's schemes to arm free Negroes in Louisiana. McCrary shows that Butler was an opportunist and that the real impetus to arm free Negroes in Louisiana came from the administration to a reflective and vacillating General Butler, who was neither radical nor conservative in this instance. Butler acted the part of the good soldier awaiting orders. The "President of the United States alone," he told Phelps, "has the authority to employ Africans in arms as part of the military forces." Without actually praising Phelps's attempts to arm Louisiana Negroes, Lincoln answered complaints from white Louisianans by telling them they could rid themselves of Phelps by making the state loyal to the Union again. Significantly, he entrusted responses to Butler on the question to Salmon Chase, who advocated arming Negroes. On July 31, 1862, Chase told Butler, "I have heard intimations from the President that it may possibly become necessary, ... to convert the heavy black population ... into defenders." Butler had been ambivalent before. He struggled with Phelps because of orders from superiors and not because of personal disapproval of radical policies. His own views were ambivalent but thoughtful. Phelps seemed at times to be stirring up trouble among the blacks. Butler expressed fear of "a negro insurrection," but commented blandly: "... the negroes are getting saucy and troublesome, and who blames them?" Later he would make a similar remark to his wife: "We have danger here of an negro insurrection. I hardly know whether to wish it or fear it most." George Denison told Chase that Butler's opposition to Phelps "was not a matter of principle." Butler simply "wanted the credit of doing it himself, and in his own way."

To focus on sections of the book of most interest to Lincoln students is to give an unbalanced picture of McCrary's work. It is masterful in its sweep. The early chapter on Louisiana before the Union occupation is a model of social and political landscape-painting. He is able to benefit from the statistical tools of the modern political historian, but his extremely skill-



From the Louis A. Warren
Lincoln Library and Museum

FIGURE 3. General P. G. T. Beauregard.

ful use of printed and manuscript sources — especially his sensitive use of articulate diaries — allows him to render his findings in a most fluent and readable prose. He understands the nature of political parties. Above all, he is steeped in knowledge of Louisiana history.

McCrary's thesis, which stresses the potential for social change in Louisiana offered by the Federal army, is sustained by his finely textured narrative of Louisiana history only in part. Here is his fullest statement of the case:

In terms of political survival, then, "Mr. Lincoln's model of reconstruction" proved a failure. Indeed, as long as President Lincoln stuck to the moderate strategy of party building employed by General Banks, it is difficult to see how it could have been otherwise. The general's assumption that a conciliatory approach would win the support of a majority of the white population contradicted the elemental political arithmetic of Louisiana and defied what might be called the central rule of any civil war: the irreconcilability of insurgents and incumbents. The polarization between left and right that leads to the outbreak of a revolutionary civil war is not "resolved" by the conclusion of armed struggle, except to the degree that the victors are able to force their ideological will upon the losers through the application of governmental power. . . .

The political dynamics of the American Civil War raised almost insurmountable obstacles in the path of the moderate reconstruction policy with which Lincoln was associated. Without suggesting that the revolutionary strategy advocated by men like Wendell Phillips or Charles Sumner would have achieved all their hopes for racial justice and Republican rule in the postwar South, it does seem to be true that the radicals advocated a more practical approach than General Banks.

McCrary is correct in asserting that wartime hatreds could not end with Northern victory in 1865, and he is right, too, to think that civil war permitted revolutionary policies unthinkable to American politicians in peacetime. Emancipation itself was one. Finally, it is true that political arithmetic in the Southern states required either black voting, military occupation, or control by ex-Confederates when the war was over.

Lincoln was a good student of political arithmetic. As G.S. Boritt has shown, when Lincoln followed policies at odds with the numerical facts of life (in advocating colonization, for example), he was not paying close attention to the problem at hand. Lincoln avoided the arithmetic of colonization as a psychological necessity, but his defiance of the arithmetic of loyalty in the South was a function of another problem. "Reconstruction was the crucial question of national politics — at least as a theoretical issue — from the moment the states of the lower South seceded from the Union," McCrary says, and this is probably the cardinal point of the new students of reconstruction policy in the Civil War. However, it is not true. The crucial question was winning the war. Though it is proper to see continuities in the hatreds of the Civil War and Reconstruction periods, the discontinuities in terms of constitutional possibility and central political concern are important as well.

Lincoln was thinking of winning the war. He thought Federal emancipation would help win it, though it was a peacetime impossibility. He thought Louisiana's political defection from the Confederate States of America would help win it too. He was less interested in Banks's policies than in Banks's speed in bringing Louisiana out of the Confederacy and into the Union. Banks thought much the same way. His "ideological" differences from the local radicals were often actually differences in estimates of what would get Louisiana out of the Confederacy fastest. Otherwise, he would not so clearly appear to be an opponent of Madison Wells in 1865. The political arithmetic of peacetime would face the constitutional conservatism of peacetime. The war was a revolutionary situation only for activities clearly related to war-making. That situation ended in 1865.

McCrary calls Banks's reasoning "curious" when the general told Lincoln that Louisiana would accept an emancipation forced on it by Banks but would never actually vote for emancipation if a radical constitutional convention offered a free constitution. "Their self-respect, their *amour propre*, will be appeased if they are not required to vote for or against it," Banks said. Curious this may be, but it is revolutionary logic, and it did recognize the grim political arithmetic of Louisiana's slave society.

It is not a small matter to argue with the thesis of a book, but in this case it by no means threatens the overall worth of the book. McCrary's is the definitive study of Lincoln's Louisiana policy, and it is an enormously informative work. There can be no quarrel with that.


Happily, Princeton University Press served its capable author well. I detected only one typographical error (page 183). The editors allowed a couple of slips here and there: Oliver B. Morton on page 281 should be Oliver P. Morton, and Edwin Bates on page 288 should be Edward Bates. McCrary overuses the verb "demonstrate" and the phrase "on a _____ly basis." Otherwise, the writing and printing are immaculate. The footnotes are at the bottom of the page, and the editors allow long ones when necessary. Except for the inexplicable absence of a political map of Louisiana, it is a model of book-making, and McCrary's historical work deserves it.

Beginning with Herman Belz's superb book *Reconstructing the Union: Theory and Policy during the Civil War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969), Lincoln students have come increasingly to question the older view that Lincoln would have been "soft" on the South. Most who have done so, however, have been forced to dance around the events in Louisiana, for it is a subject as complex as it is important. Historians need not avoid the subject any more. Peyton McCrary's beautifully written *Abraham Lincoln and Reconstruction: The Louisiana Experiment* is a detailed but eminently understandable narrative of the history of early attempts to reconstruct Louisiana. The subject of the book is really Louisiana and not Abraham Lincoln, but the events are of such importance for the history of the Lincoln administration that no Lincoln library should be without a copy.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND RECONSTRUCTION

THE LOUISIANA EXPERIMENT

by Peyton McCrary



PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

From the Louis A. Warren
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FIGURE 4. Title page of the book.



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Number 1722

LAWANDA COX ON RECONSTRUCTION IN LOUISIANA: A REVIEW

President Lincoln's attempt to reconstruct Louisiana has been the focus of a tremendous amount of attention in recent years. It has provided the exclusive subject matter of two major books in the last three years: Peyton McCrary's *Abraham Lincoln and Reconstruction: The Louisiana Experiment* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978) and LaWanda Cox's *Lincoln and Black Freedom: A Study in Presidential Leadership* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1981). Other historians have given it considerable notice in books, articles, and scholarly papers of broader focus. Reconstruction in Louisiana is a hot topic these days.

The attraction lies not so much in swampy Louisiana itself as in the subject of Reconstruction, for Lincoln made Louisiana a sort of model of his policy toward the conquered South. Interest in Reconstruction is high for three principal reasons. First, scholars, jurists, reformers, and policy makers have been look-

ing for precedents set in the 1860s and 1870s for the modern movement for civil rights for black people a century later. Indeed, the measures of the modern era are sometimes called the Second Reconstruction. That initial impulse to study the first Reconstruction is well on the wane, but scholars trained in graduate schools in the 1960s did their initial work on Reconstruction and continue to work in the field even though many reformers, jurists, and policy makers have abandoned those concerns. If that second factor may be characterized as scholarly inertia, a third factor is surely scholarly thoroughness. There is a sense abroad in academe that Reconstruction scholarship, like the Second Reconstruction to which it was a handmaiden, must move on to new insights that go well beyond the now old-fashioned attempt to prove that Reconstruction was not as bad as most white Americans used to think.

LaWanda Cox, with her late husband John, wrote one of the



From the Louis A. Warren
Lincoln Library and Museum

FIGURE 1. When Union forces arrived in Louisiana, Lincoln had his first big chance to reconstruct a state.



From the Louis A. Warren
Lincoln Library and Museum

FIGURE 2. Some New Orleans residents scrambled to take the oath of allegiance to the United States.

1960s' most important and influential works on Reconstruction, *Politics, Principle, and Prejudice, 1865-1866: Dilemma of Reconstruction America*, a book which did much to destroy Andrew Johnson's reputation. Mrs. Cox was already a mature scholar at the advent of the heyday of Reconstruction studies. Her interest in the subject endures because of essentially scholarly impulses. In her long career, she came across documents which did not seem to jibe with the accepted wisdom on Abraham Lincoln's Reconstruction policies, and she wanted to figure out what was correct.

In one respect, but in one respect only, her conclusions are not original. She shares with McCrary and other scholars a view, fast gaining wide acceptance among historians, that Abraham Lincoln would have reconstructed the South had John Wilkes Booth not stopped him. In light of the preponderance of evidence in favor of this view — one thinks immediately of the numerous Lincoln letters urging military governors in the South to get on with the work of reconstructing their states — the conclusion may seem obvious and banal. A quick glance at the conclusions reached by the previous generation of historians like Allan Nevins and James G. Randall, will quickly reveal the unanimity of the contrary opinion until very recent times. And outside the scholarly community, the older view still reigns supreme and shows few signs of movement toward the newer view. It will require many more reiterations than Mrs. Cox's to turn the tide of majority opinion, and there is nothing wrong with her reasserting this truth.

The real originality of *Lincoln and Black Freedom* lies in the nature of Mrs. Cox's proof of the proposition that Lincoln would have reconstructed the South had he lived to complete his second term. Readers of McCrary's book in particular will be surprised to see who Mrs. Cox's heroes and villains are. The reader should not be fooled by her assertion that her approach in the book was "one of reflection rather than research." She has solid documentation for her most important conclusions. She

read the crucial documents and, more important, read them with care and with discerning and sympathetic intelligence. It is a convincing book.

The care with which Mrs. Cox read the documents is apparent in her first chapter. Relying for the most part on documents read by hundreds of historians before her, she manages nevertheless to describe Lincoln's policies toward slavery in a fresh and exciting way:

When war opened possibilities unapproachable in the 1850s, Lincoln's reach was not found wanting. Indeed, there is something breathtaking in his advance from prewar advocacy of restricting slavery's spread to foremost responsibility for slavery's total, immediate, uncompensated destruction by constitutional amendment. The progression represented a positive exercise of leadership. It has often been viewed as a reluctant accommodation to pressures; it can better be understood as a ready response to opportunity. Willing to settle for what was practicable, provided it pointed in the right direction, Lincoln was alert to the expanding potential created by war. Military needs, foreign policy, Radical agitation did not force him upon an alien course but rather helped clear a path toward a long-desired but intractable objective. Having advanced, Lincoln recognized the danger of a forced retreat, a retreat to be forestalled with certainty only by military victory and constitutional amendment. His disclaimer of credit for "the removal of a great wrong" which he attributed to "God alone," though in a sense accurate, for the process of emancipation did not follow his or any man's design, was nonetheless misleading.

Although historians have often remarked on Lincoln's "growth" in office, none has heretofore called the rapidity of change in his views on slavery "breathtaking."

Can Mrs. Cox document it? In a word, yes. She notes that Lincoln was the first President ever to ask Congress to pass an amendment to the Constitution fully drafted by the President

himself (in December, 1862). "Lincoln took the initiative against slavery," she says. When he had first suggested his scheme for gradual and compensated emancipation in the border states the previous March, "Congress had not yet taken any action against slavery as such." The first Confiscation Act (August, 1861) affected only slaves used for military purposes, and the bill to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia had not yet passed either house. Even Wendell Phillips had to admit that Lincoln was "better than his Congress fellows." The Phillips letter came to light only in 1979. Mrs. Cox has been reading as well as reflecting.

Mrs. Cox's interpretation of the Emancipation Proclamation likewise gives firm support for her use of the word "breath-taking":

In issuing the Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln is sometimes seen as lagging behind Congress, which had passed the Second Confiscation Act on July 17, 1862. Yet the first draft of his proclamation was presented to the cabinet just five days later and his decision had been made earlier, at least by July 13 — that is, before Congress acted. When his advisers convinced him to delay until a Union victory, Lincoln promptly issued the first paragraph of his draft as a separate proclamation giving warning that all persons who did not return to their allegiance would be subject, as provided by the Confiscation Act, to forfeitures and seizures.

The discerning intelligence with which Mrs. Cox read the documents is everywhere apparent. She knows that tone is

important. In discussing Lincoln's message on compensated emancipation of the spring of 1862, she notes that in "earnestly beg[ging] the attention of Congress and the people," he "rejected the suggestion that he substitute 'respectfully' for 'earnestly.'" He pleaded for his program "in full view of my great responsibility to my God, and to my country." Mrs. Cox adds shrewdly: "In this first major antislavery document of his presidency the word order of 'God' and 'country' may be not unworthy of note." Lincoln was honest, but he was also crafty, as Mrs. Cox knows from her sensitive reading of his works. When rumors that Confederate peace commissioners were coming to Washington threatened passage of the Thirteenth Amendment in the House early in 1865, James Ashley asked the President for a denial.

Pressed, Lincoln sent a one-sentence, carefully phrased response: "So far as I know, there are no peace commissioners in the city, or likely to be in it." Peace commissioners, as Lincoln well knew, were on their way — but to Fortress Monroe rather than to "the city."


Lincoln and Black Freedom is a book for aficionados who will appreciate the subtle interpretations and the careful attention to chronology.

When Mrs. Cox turns her formidable talents to the subject of Reconstruction in Louisiana, she reaches even more impressive and original conclusions. Her straightforward chronological approach allows her first to document Lincoln's education into the realities of disloyal sentiment in the South. Beginning with the notion that indigenous forces in occupied Louisiana could,



From the Louis A. Warren
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FIGURE 3. Union generals lectured Louisiana's blacks on their duties as freedmen.




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FIGURE 4. Military power was much in evidence as Union soldiers practiced "street firing" in New Orleans.

with a little encouragement, create a new free state government, the President learned gradually that it could not be done — at least not before 1864, when the threat of Democratic control of the national government might end all efforts to undermine slavery. Slowly he came around to the view of General Nathaniel P. Banks, the Northern military commander in the region, that it could be done by means of military pressure without anything approaching a majority of the local population. That education informed Lincoln's general Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction of December 8, 1863, which asked only for a ten percent nucleus around which to form a free state in any of the occupied South. Banks's idea, which soon became Lincoln's, was to organize elections for state offices under the old prewar proslavery constitution and declare the parts of that constitution upholding slavery null by sheer military authority. It would take too long to wait for majority opinion even among the loyal people of Louisiana to come around to the conviction that slavery should be abolished in a new state constitution.


Readers of Peyton McCrary's *Abraham Lincoln and Reconstruction* will be surprised to hear of this concurrence of views between Lincoln and General Banks. McCrary accused Banks of deceiving Lincoln into thinking that the local antislavery loyalists, the Free State Committee led by Thomas J. Durant, were dragging their feet in registering voters for a constitutional convention. Banks, McCrary argued, gained control of the political situation in Louisiana and engineered a conservative "coup" which undermined the more radical Free State movement. As Mrs. Cox points out, however, it was a long letter from Durant to Lincoln (October, 1863) which revealed to the President that little or nothing was being done in Louisiana.

(To be continued)



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FIGURE 5. General Nathaniel P. Banks.



Lincoln Lore

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
LAWANDA COX ON RECONSTRUCTION IN LOUISIANA: A REVIEW (Cont.)

The President then blamed Banks for the lack of progress, and the general, whose military duties kept him from seeing Lincoln's letter until December 2nd, did not get around to defending himself until December 6th. Banks said, and it was true, that he had no orders authorizing him to take charge of the political situation. Since word that it would take a long time to organize a constitutional convention in Louisiana came from Durant himself, it is little wonder that Lincoln turned to Banks and sustained him, as Mrs. Cox argues, when he differed with Durant and the Free State movement.

Mrs. Cox's understanding of the situation in Louisiana is markedly different from McCrary's. In her book, Banks is depicted as leading a temporarily successful Unionist move-

ment in Louisiana fully in keeping with the President's wishes. In his book, Banks is depicted as the President's deceiver. In Mrs. Cox's work, Durant appears as a difficult stumbling block to progress toward the goal of making Louisiana a free state before adverse political developments in 1864 could undermine the work. In Mr. McCrary's work, Durant appears as a man thoroughly wronged by Banks and a President working under false assumptions about political reality in Louisiana.

Mrs. Cox wins this argument hands down. Durant chose to make his name in history by opposing the Lincoln-Banks government and by claiming that it was engineered to undermine the radical Free Staters' desire to urge suffrage for Negroes in Louisiana. *Lincoln and Black Freedom* shows that in fact



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FIGURE 1. Governor Michael Hahn's inauguration in New Orleans, March 4, 1864.



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FIGURE 2. Mrs. Banks sponsored a splendid entertainment on election day in Louisiana.

the President, Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase, and Durant himself were, in the beginning, all in agreement on the suffrage issue. All three were committed to registering freeborn black citizens, principally the New Orleans Creoles.

Durant had not gone farther than that in urging black suffrage by February, 1864. And Lincoln had already gone that far. He had twice approved registration of freeborn Negroes as voters in Louisiana. Lincoln approved Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton's order of August 24, 1863, telling the military governor in Louisiana to register "all the loyal citizens of the United States" there. Chase had objected to the first draft of the order, which stipulated organizing a constitutional convention based on the white population. The final order stipulated "loyal" citizens rather than "white" citizens. "For the instructions," Chase said, "we are indebted to Mr. Stanton and the President." In the following November, Chase had to write to urge Durant, in charge of the voter registration, to register Negro citizens. Durant replied that he favored it himself, but it would be helpful to have specific directives from Washington. Chase went to Lincoln. "I informed the President of your views on this subject," Chase told Durant on December 28, 1863, "and he said he could see no objection to the registering of such citizens, or to their exercise of the right of suffrage."

Banks ruined this hopeful unanimity of opinion on a delicate subject by opposing any black suffrage. He feared that the issue would divide Southern loyalists and endanger the abolition of slavery by the new state government. The split in the Louisiana loyalists which followed was Banks's fault, as McCrary and Cox both agree, but it was also Durant's fault. In a huff over Banks's assumption of power in Louisiana at the President's direction, he chose not to discuss and compromise but to fight the Banks government to the bitter end.

That opposition, combined with the suspicions of the radical

antislavery men that Lincoln was not radical enough to suit them, eventually doomed the Louisiana experiment. Banks, a political general if there ever was one, proved to be politically inept. Mrs. Cox describes the demise of the experiment with equally convincing attention to close reading of the documents and careful chronology. In sum, there is a great deal more in the book than can be described within the confines of this review.

If there is a significant flaw in *Lincoln and Black Freedom*, it is an error of omission rather than one of commission. Mrs. Cox tends to be a bit skimpy on biography. With as famous a figure as Lincoln, this is no problem. In his case she very properly focuses on the particular problem and aims at straightening out the reader's understanding of Lincoln's role in it.

With Nathaniel P. Banks, Mrs. Cox's failure to provide a wider biographical focus is more problematic. "The fate of Lincoln's free state," she says accurately, "suggests the vulnerability of presidential purpose and power to ineptitude of execution, the obstinacy of human nature, and misperceptions fired by the passion of great ends linked to personal conceits." She documents Lincoln's purpose in the Louisiana experiment better than anyone has ever done before. She finds the important instances of ineptitude. She describes Durant's obstinacy in unforgettable terms. She shows the vital links between personal conceits and conflicts over national policy. Yet Banks's inept policies are central to the story, as is his obstinacy and his conceit. They are as central as Lincoln's purposeful leadership, but they are not as well described.

Mrs. Cox realizes that Banks was too optimistic. When he told Lincoln that reconstructing Louisiana as a free state would be no more difficult than "the passage of a dog law in Massachusetts," Banks made one of the worst predictions in American history. Thirteen years of Federal occupation and struggle — some of it bloody — followed Banks's assumption of political control in Louisiana. There was special irony, as she points out,



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FIGURE 3. While Louisiana's loyal citizens voted, a military band played in Canal Street. It was George Washington's Birthday, and the occupying troops marked the anniversary with patriotic fervor.

"in the political general failing to be politic." She shows very well what went wrong in Louisiana, but she does not say why Banks erred. There was the factor of his gross optimism, of course, but why was he so optimistic?

Only biography can tell, and the problematic nature of Banks's conception of the Louisiana experiment seems glaring enough to demand more attention to his biography. Advising President Lincoln on Louisiana policy in 1863, Banks said:

Offer them a Government without slavery, and they will gladly accept it as a necessity resulting from the war. Other questions relating to the condition of the negro, may safely be deferred until this one is secured. If he gains freedom, education, the right to bear arms, the highest privileges accorded to any race and which none has yet proved itself worthy unless it be our own, his best friend may rest content for another year at least.

In January, he told Lincoln that the government he was creating in Louisiana with the help of Federal bayonets would provide "for the gradual restoration of power to the people" but "in such manner as to leave the control of affairs still in the hands of the commanding General." When Louisiana citizens elected Michael Hahn governor, they "understood . . . that Mr. Hahn represents a popular power entirely subordinate to the armed occupation of the state for the suppression of the rebellion and the full restoration of the authority of the government." "The election perilled nothing," Banks told the President — "Had it resulted in the election of an opponent, he would be without power." When Louisiana's new constitution abolished slavery in September, Banks crowed: "History will record the fact that all the problems involved in restoration of States . . .

have already been solved in Louisiana with a due regard to the elevation of the black and security of the white Race."

Such optimism seems glaringly wrong in the light of subsequent events in Louisiana, but it is more than "twenty-twenty hindsight" that makes the error clear. Foresight at the time surely demanded that General Banks ask what would happen when the Federal troops left. Would the Negro's advance, left to the future, occur then? When the Confederates returned, the opposition would surely win elections. Would the opponents be powerless then? To be sure, Banks's statements were meant to let Lincoln know that the military would not allow a disloyal government to rule if the Unionists lost in 1864, but should not even that mention of the subject have caused Banks to wonder about 1865 or 1866?

Banks was sanguine. He would let the future take care of itself. His government would satisfy the abolitionists for another year (he thought, wrongly), and that was all that concerned him. Banks lived day to day, so to speak, but he also thought that his work in Louisiana guaranteed him immortal fame. "History" would record his deeds. He was conscious of history. He was thinking about what would be said of his Louisiana government in the long run, but he had no long-range plan. Why not?

It is impossible to tell for certain, but a look at the general's career before the Louisiana experiment offers at least one enticing clue. General Banks's first command was the Department of Annapolis. There, in 1861, he controlled the corridor from the Northern states to Washington, D.C. His headquarters was in Baltimore, and Banks "found the situation one of Southern hearts and Northern muskets," as his able biographer, Fred

Harvey Harrington, states. He tried to be conciliatory first, and secession sentiment soared. He was ordered to get tougher. Eventually, Banks's soldiers installed a pro-Union successor to the notoriously secessionist police marshal.

Banks then became the head of the Army of the Shenandoah, and more of Maryland came under his jurisdiction. On George B. McClellan's orders, he arrested secessionist members of the Maryland legislature on their way to Frederick for a special session. His soldiers "protected" the polls, as pro-Union forces swept to victory in the autumn elections.

In later years, Banks would boast that his administration of Maryland was a model for Reconstruction:

The secession leaders — the enemies of the people — were replaced and loyal men assigned to . . . their duties. This made Maryland a loyal State. . . . What occurred there will occur in North Carolina, in South Carolina, in Georgia, in Alabama and Mississippi. If . . . those States shall be controlled by men that are loyal . . . we shall then have loyal populations and loyal governments.

The Maryland experience helps to explain Banks's optimism.

As was more often the case than has been commonly recognized in the study of Reconstruction, such optimism was rooted in a particular analysis of Southern society. The analysis perhaps came easier to former Democrats (like Banks), who were used to invoking a form of class analysis in their prescriptions for political policy. It may have come easier as well to a politician of working class origins (like Banks, the "Bobbin Boy of Massachusetts"). Banks vowed to build a loyal Louisiana out of the "humble and honest farmer, the poor mechanic, the hard-

working classes, the bone and sinew of the land." It will not do to dismiss such statements as the rhetorical litany of American politicians. Banks had blamed secession on a tiny elite of rich planters and a Southern urban aristocracy. He thought that a "clear majority of the people were . . . opposed to the war and could you remove from the control of public opinion one or two thousand in each of these States . . . you would have a population in all of these States . . . loyal and true to the Government."

General Banks may have been inept, but his miscalculations were born of practical experience in Maryland and of assumptions about the social composition of Southern society. His conceit stemmed from memories of his role in one of the North's two big political successes early in the war, the retention of Maryland in the Union. His obstinacy in pursuing his political plan was rooted in a fairly systematic political philosophy which told him what Southern society was like. The deeper roots of the ineptitude, conceit, and obstinacy of the other characters in the Louisiana experiment likewise demand study.

There are limits to what any one historian can do. Mrs. Cox has done more than most. One need only think of the muddled state of scholarship on early Louisiana Reconstruction before her work — and that of McCrary and other recent scholars as well — to be grateful for the modern accomplishments in this field.

On February 10, 1982, the Civil War Round Table of New York City gave LaWanda Cox the Barondess/Lincoln Award for *Lincoln and Black Freedom*. She deserved it. Her book is a contribution to Lincoln scholarship that will last.



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FIGURE 4. A photographer in New Orleans, E. Jacobs, took a picture of Banks and his staff in the spring of 1864. This woodcut was copied from it.

Personal Instructions From Lincoln.
General William H. Seward, son of Lincoln's secretary of state, was the principal speaker at the recent celebration in Auburn, N. Y., of the Cayuga County Historical society. His theme was "Personal Recollections of Abraham Lincoln." Referring to Lincoln's predilection for telling stories, General Seward said:

"I have often heard him tell his famous stories, sometimes at serious official gatherings, and, though droll and amusing, I think he told them to relieve the sense of crushing responsibility then resting upon him. There were many occasions when I talked with him intimately, especially during my army life, one or two of which at least I may mention here.

"Perhaps my most cherished recollection is one which I have not felt at liberty to relate until today. It was a military commission he once personally intrusted to me. It was early in 1863, and while sitting as president at a court martial in Virginia a special messenger came to me with an order to report at headquarters in Washington. After an exceedingly muddy ride of more than twenty miles I reported in little less than three hours, covered with mud and making anything but a respectable appearance. I was told that the president wished to see me at once. Looking more like a tramp than a soldier, I should probably not have been admitted to the White House except for the fact that I was well known to the old porter at the door.

"I was shown into the library, where I found Mr. Lincoln, who greeted me kindly, saying in substance:

"We wish to communicate with General Banks, now in New Orleans, just about to start on his campaign through the Teche country. All communication by land being cut off, our messenger must go by sea, and, as this takes a long time, it is probable that his army will be well advanced in Louisiana before you can reach him. Most of this country is hostile, but General Banks must be found wherever he may be. You will therefore have to take the chance of riding alone, as no guard which you could take would be of sufficient protection. Our dispatch, which is now being prepared in the war department, is of great importance and must not fall into the enemy's hands. Commit your dispatch to memory, conceal it and in case of possible capture destroy it. Start tonight, if possible, and now goodbye, my boy. God bless you!

"He grasped me by the hand and, looking into my face with his deep, sad eyes, bade me farewell. My body tingling with enthusiasm to carry out his commission, I hastened to the war department, where my interview with Secretary Stanton was much more formal and military. I found him standing at his high desk, as he most always did when at work, looking sharply over the top of his spectacles. He said briefly:

"Colonel, the president has explained to you what we want. Can you do it?"

"I answered simply 'Yes.'

"The dispatch is ready. Don't let it fall into rebel hands. Good night, sir!" he said as I received it.

"After a tempestuous voyage of more than fourteen days on the government transport Blackstone, during which fire and mutiny occurred, I reached New Orleans, only to find that General Banks had been gone more than a week. After an exciting ride of over 100 miles through the enemy's country I overtook him at New Iberla and delivered my dispatch."



